Tags: Damage Mechanisms Inspection Mechanical Integrity Probability
In mechanical integrity, we often confuse activity with assurance. A thick report or "100% coverage" means nothing if the inspection tool cannot "see" the damage morphology. This post explores what "good" inspection actually looks like by shifting the focus toward meaningfully reducing uncertainty. Learn the critical questions every program must answer and how to align NDE physics with specific damage mechanisms to prevent loss-of-containment events.

A friend of mine, a true gentleman and an experienced API inspector, posed a simple but powerful question on LinkedIn last week:
"What does good actually look like in inspection?"
The person who asked it was Paul Evey, and his post can be found here. It gets directly to the heart of why mechanical integrity (MI) continues to fail across refineries and process facilities.
As an engineer, my inspection friends will tell you that engineers have a tendency to over-analyze. In this case, I would argue that over-analysis is exactly what is required. Because "good inspection" is not intuitive, and it is certainly not defined by tradition, habit, or audit checklists.
A good inspection is not defined by:
Those are measures of activity, not assurance.
A good inspection is defined by one thing:
Did we meaningfully reduce uncertainty about the damage mechanism?
If the answer is no, the inspection - no matter how expensive or comprehensive it looked - did not accomplish its purpose.
A good inspection program must be able to answer these questions:
| Question | What "Good" Looks Like |
|---|---|
| What can fail? | The damage mechanisms are correctly identified, localized, and bounded. |
| Where will it fail? | The highest-risk locations are known and actually examined. |
| Would we see it if it's there? | The inspection method has a demonstrated probability of detection (POD) for the relevant damage mechanisms (>= ~70%). |
| Does the report allow independent technical review? | The report contains enough information for a knowledgeable third party to evaluate what was examined and what could reasonably have been detected. |
At a minimum, the inspection report must include:
Without this information, the report may look professional, but it cannot be used to quantify inspection effectiveness.
In many facilities, inspection programs deliver:
That produces confidence, not knowledge of the actual condition. Confidence, when it is unearned, can be deadly.
A real inspection program would work like this:
Not just "corrosion," but:
Each of these produces very different flaw shapes and very different inspection challenges.
Inspection methods must be chosen based on what they can actually detect, not what is convenient or cheap:
Physics matters. If the tool cannot "see" the flaw morphology, coverage is meaningless.
We must be able to answer:
In reality, we often do not know these numbers and rely on engineering judgment. If that judgment is provided by inexperienced personnel, we are not estimating we are guessing.
"Good" inspection is about reducing uncertainty, not about achieving coverage metrics. The biggest lie in modern inspection is:
"We had 100% coverage."
Coverage of what? With what sensitivity? For what damage mechanism? You can have 100% coverage and a 0% probability of detecting the flaw that will cause a loss of containment.
That is how HF leaks, exchanger ruptures, and refinery fires keep happening - even though "everything was inspected."
Paul Evey asked an important question. The industry needs to answer it honestly. If we truly want to prevent loss-of-containment events, we must stop mistaking inspection activity for inspection effectiveness and start demanding evidence that our programs actually reduce uncertainty about failure.
I invite the industry to have this conversation. What are your thoughts? Comment below, join the conversation on LinkedIn, or contact me directly. I am excited to hear your thoughts.
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